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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction.
The trial court denied Curtis Kaneaster's Motion to Suppress the evidence

found during the search of his vehicle. It found that he had no standing to
challenge the search because he had waived his Fourth Amendment rights when he
accepted the terms and conditions of parole. After that decision, the Supreme Court
decided State v. Maxim, 454 P.3d 543 (Idaho 2019), which held that parolees like
Mr. Kaneaster do have standing. However, the state failed to argue any other
exception to the warrant requirement to justify the search. And the evidence
considered by the district court does not establish one. Finally, under Maxim, the
parole search provision did not salvage the unreasonable search of the vehicle
because there is no evidence that the officer had knowledge of the search provision
much less the specific contents of the provision here.
B.

Statement of the Case.
Mr. Kaneaster was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit

Methamphetamine and/or Amphetamine. R 23-24. The substance was found in the
burnt residue of a meth pipe found within a black box, which was inside a duffle bag
located in the back-storage area of the Chevy Trail Blazer driven by Mr. Kaneaster.
R 13.

Officer Nikola Gumeson stated in his Affidavit in Support of Complaint that
on February 5, 2019, at approximately 2:00 a.m., he saw "Curtis Kaneaster driving
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a black Chevrolet Trail Blazer, bearing Idaho plate 2G4 7598 in the 800 block of
Blue Lakes Blvd. N." in Twin Falls, Idaho R 13. When he ran Mr. Kaneaster's
information, he learned that he had an IDOC warrant for his arrest. He conducted
a traffic stop of the vehicle. R 13.
According to the Affidavit, dispatch informed Officer Gumeson "that the
warrant was confirmed[.]" Id. He then made Mr. Kaneaster step out of the vehicle
and placed him in custody. The officer "asked [the passenger] to step out of the
vehicle so I could search it based on both individuals being on parole." Id. He
located a "small butane torch in Mr. Kaneaster's pocket when I searched him
incident to arrest." Id. Officer Gumeson said, "I know through my experience that
butane torches are often used when individuals smoke methamphetamine." Id.
The officer continued:
The officer then searched the passenger compartment of the Trailblazer.
When I looked in the back, I saw a black plastic "Apache" box sitting on top of
a black duffle bag. The duffel bag was open and I could see a black shoulder
holster for a handgun right next to the black box. I could also see men's
cologne and male clothing inside duffel bag .
. . . . Inside the side pocket of the black duffle bag, were several butane torch
stems. I looked inside the black Apache box that was on top of all these items
and located a multi colored glass pipe, With white burnt residue in the bowl
portion. I recognized this to be a smoking device for methamphetamine.
There was also 19 small plastic baggies inside the black box. These are
commonly used in drug sales.

Id., pg. 14.
Mr. Kaneaster was taken to the Twin Falls County Jail where he was booked
for the warrant and for possession of the methamphetamine. The officer field tested
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the pipe at the police department and obtained a presumptively positive result.
"The pipe was submitted into evidence and asked to be sent to the state lab
for further testing." R 14.
At the preliminary hearing, the officer testified that he saw Mr. Kaneaster in
a gas station parking lot. He "was able to run his information and learned that he
had an IDOC warrant." Preliminary Hearing Transcript ("PHT") p. 5, ls. 20-21.
Mr. Kaneaster began driving down Blue Lakes Boulevard and the officer made a
traffic stop. PHT p. 6, ls. 1-5. After a second unit arrived, the officer ordered Mr.
Kaneaster out the vehicle and patted him down. The passenger was also patted
down. PHT p. 7, ls. 7-19. During the pat down of Mr. Kaneaster, the officer found a
butane lighter in his shirt pocket. The officer said that some people use butane
lighters to smoke illegal drugs "because they are a hotter heat source." PHT p. 8, ls.
1-6. "Once [Mr. Kaneaster] was secured in the back [of his patrol vehicle] and once
the passenger was in the back of the other cop's car, [the officer] then searched the
vehicle for any drugs, illegal items." PHT p. 8, ls. 10-12. The officer found a "glass
pipe with white reside inside" in the back of the vehicle, located in a plastic box,
which was stored inside a duffle bag. Id., ls. 13-19.
There was no evidence that the officer was aware that Mr. Kaneaster had
signed a search provision as part of his parole agreement. See PHT pgs. 1-21; CR
13-15 (Officer's Affidavit).
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C.

Proceedings Below.
Mr. Kaneaster filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support. R

41-64. He argued that the warrantless search of the vehicle after Mr. Kaneaster's
arrest on the warrant violated Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). R 59. He also
argued that there were no other exceptions to the warrant requirement to justify
the search, such as probable cause to believe there would be evidence of a crime
therein. R 62-63.
The state opposed the motion arguing that Mr. Kaneaster did not have
standing to bring the motion. The state's entire argument is set forth below:
Only a person whose rights are infringed may obtain suppression of evidence.
State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 236, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct. 1994). A defendant thus
attempting to suppress evidence obtained from a search must first
demonstrate standing to challenge the search. See State v. Holland, 135
Idaho 159, 162, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000).
The defendant's motion to suppress fails because he waived his constitutional
rights concerning searches. In fact, as part of his parole agreement, the
defendant consented to searches by law enforcement officers of both his
person of places over which the defendant was exercising controlling
authority.
That is what happened here: the officer stopped a vehicle that the defendant
was driving, in other words exercising controlling authority, and
subsequently searched the defendant's person and vehicle. It does not matter
how the officer confirmed the defendant's identity.
R 69 (emphasis original).
The motion was set for hearing, prior to which the court met with counsel in
chambers. T (6/29/19) p.3. ls. 19-19-22. At that time, defense counsel stipulated
that Mr. Kaneaster was on parole and stipulated to his parole agreement. Id, p. 5,
ls. 16-20. The parole agreement states, in relevant part, that:
4

Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for
which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a
law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth
Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches.
R84.
Based upon the above, the court ruled as follows:
Under the Constitution, everybody has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
and that is what requires that either articulable suspicion or probable cause,
I should say, for a search or requires a warrant from a magistrate to proceed
with a search. And that is also the reasonable expectation of privacy, is also
what provides you standing to challenge whether or not the search was
appropriately done.
In this case, the Agreement of Supervision that you signed, that the Court is
adopting and has been stipulated to as a correct Agreement -- or I should say
as an accurate and correct copy of the Agreement of Supervision that you
signed, Paragraph No. 5 of that agreement provides that -- and I will just
read it - "I," which is you, "I consent to the search of my person, residence,
vehicle, personnel -- and personal property and other real property or
structures owned or leased by me for which I am the controlling authority
conducted by any agent of the IDOC or a law enforcement officer. I hereby
waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitution
concerning searches.

The Court finds that in Idaho the Supreme Court has determined that a
probationer or parolee's consent to searches, that constitutes a waiver of the
Fourth Amendment rights. That has been the case in Idaho since 1987.
Under State vs. Gawron, G-a-w-r-o-n, at 112 Idaho 841 [(1987)], was recently
upheld -- not recently but more recently upheld. In State vs. Perdum, 147
Idaho 206 [(2009)], the Court finds that there was a voluntary waiver of the -of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that he consented to the
search and so that the defendant does not have standing to challenge the
search of the vehicle where the controlled substances were found.
T (6/29/2019) p. 7, 1. 16 - p.8, 1. 9; p. 10, 1. 23 - p. 11, 1. 10.
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The court held a hearing to reconsider the above ruling. T (7/15/2019), p. 5, 1.
12.
Mr. Kaneaster was permitted to present legal argument in support of the
motion to reconsider. T (7/15/2019), p. 16, 1. 9-16. He argued that the search
provision was invalid as to the authority given to law enforcement officers to
conduct searches not under the direction of the Idaho Department of Corrections
because that would violate Article X, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution and the nondelegation doctrine found in Article II, § 1. Thus, the search provision should be
construed to only permit law enforcement officers to conduct searches when given
permission by an agent of the IDOC. He argued that the police officer's search was
not a part of the control, direction, and management of his parole because it was not
done with the knowledge and approval of his parole officer. T (7/15/2019), p. 9, 1. 6 p. 11, 1. 24. He stated: "A search of me can only be consider[ed] a parole search
when Probation Or Parole or Idaho Department of Corrections is the supervising
authority of this contract makes the decision to search me or have me searched; in
others words, to instigate the search." Id, p. 16, ls. 6-10. Thus, Officer Gumeson' s
attempt to enforce the powers belonging to the Department of Corrections violated
Article X, § 5. Id, p. 16, ls. 21-25.
The court took judicial notice of the affidavit of probable cause and the
preliminary hearing transcript. T (7/15/2019) p. 18, 1. 14-20. It then denied the
motion to reconsider, stating:
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The Court is not going to overrule its prior ruling. I will, however -- well, I'll
set my ruling on the record at this time as well.

Because you had an outstanding warrant, the officer clearly had reasonable
and articulable suspicion to stop you. That issue has been addressed for
probably over 30 years in the State of Idaho, that a warrant is a sufficient
reason for pulling you over.
And then further, upon effecting that arrest warrant and arresting you, the
officer did have the right to search the vehicle in which you were located.
That's the Armstrong case, 158 Idaho and 364, where you have waived your
Fourth Amendment rights. That waiver is valid. And the -- however, that
waiver can only be exercised to the extent you have waived your Fourth
Amendment rights.
In the Agreement of Supervision, which was admitted at the last hearing
without objection, the Agreement of Supervision that you signed indicated
that you consent to the search of your person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures that are owned or leased by
you, or for which you are the controlling authority, and conducted by any
agent of IDOC or a law enforcement officer.

It further provides -- and I quote -- I hereby waive my rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the Idaho Constitution concerning searches, closed
quote.
Pursuant to that waiver, you did waive your right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. And pursuant to
your waiver, any law enforcement officer could have effectuated that search,
as happened in this case.
And so the stop was legally valid. The search was legally valid. You waived
your Fourth Amendment rights, and so your motion to suppress the
subsequent drugs that were found is denied.
T (7/15/2019) p. 18, 1. 21 - p. 20, 1. 18. The court did not specifically address Mr.
Kaneaster's argument that the extension of the search provision to law enforcement
officers acting without direction by parole authorities exceeded the authority of the
Board of Corrections as well as the non-delegation doctrine. Id.
7

Trial began on July 30, 2019 (R 99) and a guilty verdict was returned on July
31, 2019. R 138. The Judgment was entered on October 1, 2019 (R 145) and a
Notice of Appeal was filed on October 11, 2019. R 156. On December 4, 2019, this
Court decided State v. Maxim, 454 P.3d 543 (Idaho 2019), where it found a parolee
who had signed an agreement identical to the one here had standing to challenge a
warrantless search of his home.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Considering State v. Maxim, did the court err in denying the motion to
suppress based upon the finding that Mr. Kaneaster did not have standing?

B.

Was the search of the interior of the vehicle unreasonable?

C.

Does the search provision of the parole agreement salvage the unreasonable
search?

D.

Alternatively, is the search provision invalid because it exceeded the scope of
the authority given to the Board of Corrections under Art. X, § 5 of the state
constitution and the non-delegation clause of Art. II, § 1?

E.

Can the state show the error in denying the motion to suppress was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt?

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Under Maxim, Mr. Kaneaster has Standing to Bring the Motion to Suppress.
As set forth above, this Court found a parolee to have standing to bring a

motion to suppress in Maxim. That holding controls this case too, as Mr.
Kaneaster's search provision is identical to the one in Maxim. Compare R 84 with
454 P.3d at 552. And Maxim applies to this case under Griffith v. Kentucky, 4 79
U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
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In finding that standing existed, this Court in Maxim rejected the standing
argument made by the state in this case.
The State is correct that this is a broad grant of consent. It is not conditioned
on the "at the request of'' language like that of Jaskowski. See id Rather, it is
like the language in State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295,
1297 (1987). But these Fourth Amendment waivers do not eviscerate Fourth
Amendment rights, they only tip the scales of the reasonableness analysis. In
Gawron, this Court responded to the defendant's argument that such broad
waivers are an unreasonable invasion of Fourth Amendment rights by
recognizing that "such persons conditionally released to societies have a
reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government
authorities 'reasonable' which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid
under traditional constitutional concepts." Id As a result, the State's
suggestion that such a waiver categorically precludes a probationer from
succeeding in a motion to suppress is incorrect. To be sure, the challenge is
more difficult, but not impossible.

State v. Maxim, 454 P.3d at 549-50. As is manifest, the district court's denial of the
motion to suppress was in error because Mr. Kaneaster does have standing to bring
the motion.
Standing was the only theory raised by the state in defense of the
warrantless search. R67-69. Thus, it failed to argue or establish an exception to
the warrant requirement below and the denial of the Motion to Suppress should be
reversed. In addition, an analysis of the evidence before the district court shows
there was no such exception.

B.

The Search of the Interior of the Vehicle was Unreasonable Because There
was no Warrant or Probable Cause to Search the Interior and the Search
Exceeded the Scope ofa Search Incident to Arrest.
Mr. Kaneaster argued that the search of the interior of the vehicle was

constitutionally unreasonable. R 41-63. He was correct. First, there was no
warrant authorizing the search. The warrant here was an arrest warrant, not a
9

search warrant. The "basic rule" of the Fourth Amendment is "that 'searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment --subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 338 (2009), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
"[T]he State has the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish an exception
to the warrant requirement." State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920 (2007).
Second, assuming Mr. Kaneaster was validly arrested, the results of the
search of Mr. Kaneaster's person incident to arrest did not establish probable cause
to search inside the vehicle. One exception to the warrant requirement is the socalled "automobile exception, under which police officers may search an automobile
and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe that the
automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho
417, 427 (Ct. App. 2015), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925);

State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1991). "Probable cause is a flexible, common
sense standard. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is
present is all that is required." Id., citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983);

State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61 (Ct. App. 2011).
All that was found on Mr. Kaneaster's person was a butane torch, a perfectly
legal item to possess. That and the existence of the parole arrest warrant does not
suggest there would be evidence of a crime within the vehicle, much less establish
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that to a probability. Thus, the facts failed to establish this possible exception to
the warrant requirement.
The final possible exception to the warrant requirement would be under the
"search incident to arrest" doctrine. However, the search of the vehicle exceeded the
scope of a valid search incident to arrest. "Police may search a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S., at
351. Here, Mr. Kaneaster was in a patrol car when the vehicle was searched and
there was no reason to believe the vehicle contained evidence regarding the offense
of arrest, which was not an offense at all, but the arrest warrant.
In short, the state failed to even argue, much less demonstrate, any of the
possible exceptions to the warrant requirement to justify the search of the vehicle.
C.

Under Maxim, the Search Provision Cannot Salvage the Otherwise
Unreasonable Entry and Search of the Vehicle because there is no Evidence
the Officers were Aware of the Waiver at the Time of the Search.
The Maxim Court also wrote:
We hold that a Fourth Amendment waiver cannot salvage an otherwise
unreasonable entry into a home under the Fourth Amendment if the police

officers were unaware of the waiver at the time of the unconstitutional
search. We are not alone in this common-sense approach. The discovery of a
Fourth Amendment waiver after the fact should not serve as a deus ex
machina allowing the State to rewrite the story in the courtroom when the
police's actions were unconstitutional outside of it.

Id., 454 P.3d at 550 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the court
never found that the officer was aware of the search waiver, as distinct from Mr.
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Kaneaster's parole status, at the time of the search. Nor is there any evidence of
such knowledge in the officer's Affidavit of Probable Cause or in the Preliminary
Hearing Transcripts. Moreover, the state has never even claimed that the officer
was aware of the existence of the search provision. See R 65-69. (State's Response
to Defendant's Motion to Suppress). Thus, the state has failed to meet its burden
and the evidence from the vehicle search should have been suppressed. State v.

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 993 (1992).

D.

The Search Provision is Invalid Because it Exceeded the Scope of the
Authority Given to the Board of Corrections under Art. X, § 5 of the State
Constitution and the Non-Delegation Clause ofArt. II, § 1.
Article II, § 1 of the state constitution reads:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to
either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted
Article X, § 5 reads:
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as the
state board of correction, and to consist of three members appointed by the
governor, one member for two years, one member for four years, and one
member for six years. After the appointment of the first board the term of
each member appointed shall be six years. This board shall have the control,
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state, their employees
and properties, and ofadult felony probation and parole, with such
compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law.

Id. (emphasis added).
This Court has "jurisdiction to determine the validity of a pardon,
commutation or parole as affected by the question whether the granting authority
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had power to do so." Miller v. Meredith, 59 Idaho 385, 388-89 (1938). Here, the
granting authority did not have the power to give law enforcement officers carte
blanche to search parolees. The constitutional authority to control, direct and
manage adult parolees rests with the Board of Corrections. It may not delegate
that authority to another agency. However, that is what the search provision in
this case purports to do. It purports to allow law enforcement agents to control,
direct and manage parolees through the power to search them without knowledge or
permission of an agent of IDOC. And that is what happened in this case, as Officer
Gumeson did not advise IDOC of Mr. Kaneaster's arrest and further did not seek
permission from an IDOC agent. Thus, the search provision should be limited to
permit law enforcement agents to conduct searches when the IDOC has knowledge
of the impending search and gives permission for the law enforcement agent to
proceed. The Idaho Courts have approved searches in such circumstances. See e.g.,

State v. Fenton, 163 Idaho 318, 322 (Ct. App. 2017) (probation officer enlisted the
assistance of the officer in searching Fenton's vehicle.)
In fact, the Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 370 (Ct.
App. 2015), found there was no delegation problem because the parole officer
enlisted the aid of the police in conducting a search. The Court wrote:
The police involvement here constituted nothing more than assistance with
the parole officer's request to perform a search. As a result, use of local law
enforcement to execute the search of Armstrong's vehicle pursuant to his
Fourth Amendment waiver was not an unconstitutional delegation of the
Board's Article X, Section 5 duty to supervise parole and parolees.

Id., 158 Idaho at 370.
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By contrast, the search here, was conducted without the knowledge or
permission of the IDOC and should not be found to be reasonable pursuant to the
search provision. That provision should be construed to be limited to those searches
by law enforcement officers which are done with the knowledge and approval of an
agent of the IDOC. To read that provision more broadly, as the trial court did,
would allow IDOC to unconstitutionally delegate its exclusive authority to control,
direct, and manage adult parolees. It cannot do so, and the search provision is
invalid to that extent.

E.

The State Cannot Show the Error in Denying the Motion to Suppress was
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), this Court decided to "employ the

Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] harmless error test to all objected-to
error." Id, at 222.
A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error
shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point
the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id The state cannot meet its burden under Chapman/ Perry. When the evidence
from the unreasonable search of the vehicle is suppressed, there is no evidence that
Mr. Kaneaster possessed the methamphetamine found therein. Thus, the
conviction should be reversed, and the matter remained for the entry of a judgment
of acquittal.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The order Denying the Motion to Suppress should be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 13 th day of August, 2020.

/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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